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 PI claim clears the statute bar 
 
Personal injury claim against employer - Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 
2003 s302 – proceeding commenced 61 days after compulsory conference – claim not 
statute-barred under Limitation of Actions Act 1974 – whether s302(2) applied to bar 
claim – whether open to plaintiff to deliver a second notice of claim to support court 
proceeding 
In Hughes v Impulse Entertainment Pty Ltd & WorkCover Queensland [2013] QDC 21 the 
plaintiff commenced a proceeding more than 60 days after the compulsory conference 
under the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld). 
The question to be determined was whether this meant the claim was statute-barred under 
that Act, even though the relevant limitation period under the Limitation of Actions Act 
1974 (Qld) had not expired. 
The facts 
The plaintiff held a sales position with his employer which involved a significant amount of 
driving. He alleged that he suffered injury because his job description involved the driving 
that it did. The injuries were alleged to have occurred over the period from May 2007 to 
October 2009. 
The parties had progressed through the pre-litigation procedures mandated by the Workers’ 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (the Act). The requisite compulsory 
conference failed to resolve the claim, and the parties exchanged mandatory final offers, 
neither of which was accepted. 
The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the District Court for damages for personal injury 
against his employer and WorkCover Queensland on 31 January 2012. This was 61 days after 
the holding of the compulsory conference. 
The plaintiff applied under s300(3)(b) of the Act for an extension of the time prescribed 
under s300 for service of initiating proceedings on the employer. The defendants brought a 
cross-application for striking out of the claim under r171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 1999 (Qld) on the basis that the plaintiff had fallen foul of s302(2) of the Act and that 
in consequence the claim was statute-barred.  
The legislation 
Section 236 of the Act (Period of Limitation under Limitation of Actions Act 1974 never 
affected) provides that the period of limitation under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 
(Qld) is not affected by the Act, subject to s302 of the Act. 
Section 300 of the Act provides, so far as relevant: 
300 Carriage of proceedings 
… 
(3) If a claim has not been settled at a compulsory conference, then despite any rule 
of court, the legal process that starts the proceeding must be served on the 
employer— 
(a) within 60 days after the day the conference was held; or 
(b) within the further period that the court orders on the claimant’s 
application. 
 
Section 302 of the Act provides, so far as relevant: 
 
302 Alteration of period of limitation 
(1) A claimant may bring a proceeding for damages for personal injury after the end 
of the period of limitation allowed for bringing a proceeding for damages for 
personal injury under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 only if— 
… 
(2) However, the proceeding must be brought within 60 days after a compulsory 
conference for the claim is held. 
 
The submissions 
It was conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that, if the proceeding went ahead and the 
defendants wished to invoke the limitations legislation, a limitation period would be a 
procedural bar to any parts of the claim arising before 31 January 2009. It was submitted, 
however, that specific incidents and perhaps general features of the plaintiff’s employment 
occurring after 31 January 2009 were available to found a claim complying with the 
strictures of the Limitation of Actions Act. 
The defendants relied on the decision of de Jersey CJ in Narayan v S-Pak Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 
373. The Chief Justice concluded in that case that s302(2) prescribed a limitation period, and 
that the court did not have power to extend it. It was submitted that although the Act may 
work to extend the period under the Limitation of Actions Act in some cases, and indeed in 
the usual case, it was equally capable of working to subject a plaintiff to a shorter limitation 
period than the Limitation of Actions Act allows. The defendants submitted that the Act had 
that effect in this case. 
The analysis 
Robin QC DCJ noted that in Narayan v S-Pak Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 373, as in a number of other 
authorities the parties had drawn to his attention, the limitation period had expired. 
His Honour then referred to the approach to interference with well-established common 
law or like rights acknowledged by the High Court in Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon 
[2006] 225 CLR 364. He noted the Queensland Court of Appeal had taken that approach in 
Cousins v Mt Isa Mines Limited [2006] 2 Qd R 343 at [33]. 
Reference was also made to sections 236 and 300 of the Act. In relation to the latter 
provision, Robin QC DCJ accepted the submission for the defendants that s300(3)(a) of the 
Act may contain an assumption that the proceeding would have commenced within the 60-
day limit for service, which is susceptible of extension. However his Honour found nothing in 
that provision, or in section 302 or in the combination of them, which would indicate that 
the plaintiff’s proceeding was invalid. 
By way of defining what was encompassed by the term “the proceeding” in s301(2), Robin 
QC DCJ found that by reference to subsection (1) it meant “a proceeding for damages for 
personal injury [brought] after the end of the period of limitation allowed for bringing a 
proceeding for damages for personal injury under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld)”. 
In line with this analysis, he concluded that the construction of s302(2) of the Act put 
forward for the defendants could not be correct. 
His Honour also considered the situation that would prevail if, contrary to his view, the 
proceeding based on the original notice failed. He noted in this context that on receiving the 
advice from WorkCover that it regarded the proceeding as fatally flawed, the plaintiff’s legal 
representatives had served a new s275 notice of claim in identical terms to the original one. 
His Honour examined the question whether various provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act 
1954 (Qld), particularly sections 23(1) or 38(4), would constitute a statutory justification for 
the plaintiff to start the pre-proceedings processes again. He found, however, that such 
provisions were “probably unnecessary”, since there was nothing in the Act to preclude a 
claimant from giving more than one notice of claim. 
The judge also referred to authorities in support of the view that in the ordinary course 
applicants are free to make more than one application or other attempt in proceedings 
unless doing so is adjudged an abuse of process or there is an issue estoppel: DA Christie Pty 
Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 58; Re Il Palazzo (Management) Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] 
QSC 375, BC200106236. 
The order made was in the terms of paragraph 1 of the plaintiff’s originating application. 
The cross-application was dismissed. 
Comment 
This approach to the construction of s302(2) of the Act recognises the importance of 
allowing a claimant the opportunity to litigate a claim, and restricting that right only where 
legislation requires this in the clearest of terms. It is submitted that it would certainly be 
undesirable if a claim, which was not statute-barred under the Limitation of Actions Act 
1974 (Qld), was barred in circumstances such as those in this case. 
In relation to the possibility of giving multiple notices of claim, there is no doubt that to do 
so may be both inconvenient and confusing. It is worth noting the judge’s endorsement of 
the submission for the plaintiff on this issue that any party embarrassed by not knowing 
whether a claimant intends to pursue any of multiple notices of claim to proceeding stage 
may invoke s287 of the Act (Court’s power to enforce compliance with chapter.) 
 
